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The development of Latin America and the Caribbean is still a work 
in progress. Although there have been macroeconomic improvements, 
allowing the region to confront the recent crisis on a better footing, 
this crisis has exposed old and new structural constraints faced by the 
countries of the region, which are reflected in the persistence of large 
social, economic, fiscal and environmental gaps. These gaps need to 
be closed for the sake of future generations and as a precondition for 
viable development that combines economic growth with equality and 
sustainability. This suggests that there are more than just economic 
reasons for the State to play, once again, a major role in development 
strategies, so that public policies take the lead in building the future. The 
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ECLAC has put forward three general hypotheses about 
the character and consequences of the recent crisis. The 
first is that it is not just a manifestation of weaknesses 
in financial system regulations, or the exclusive result 
of a moral crisis brought on by ambition and greed. 
The crisis is also bringing a particular “development 
style” to an end and opening up new avenues for 
economic, social and environmental debate.
The second hypothesis is that the State needs 
to play a renewed part in guiding development 
strategies in the region’s countries. Setting out from 
a critical review of its recent performance, there is 
a vital need to redefine the role of the State and the 
way it operates, with a view to achieving a balanced 
interaction between the market, institutions and 
citizens in the development process.
The third hypothesis, which follows naturally 
from the first two, is that there needs to be a return 
to the idea of  building “long-term” development 
strategies. This will require a greater capacity to 
devise and implement public policy measures that 
can reconcile what is enduringly important with the 
needs of the moment.
For all the progress in the past decade, the 
economic and social development of Latin America 
and the Caribbean is still a work in progress. There 
have been major macroeconomic advances that have 
translated into an improved fiscal situation, lower 
inflation and lower levels of external debt, all of which 
put the countries on a better footing to deal with the 
global economic and financial crisis that began in 2008. 
At the same time, however, successive financial shocks 
since the 1990s have resulted in more volatile business 
cycles and an unsatisfactory growth pattern. Old 
problems like the dynamics of productivity, economic 
heterogeneity and the creation and dissemination of 
technological capabilities still persist and underlie 
some of the structural constraints affecting the region. 
Thus, while the recent crisis has shown how important 
it is to strengthen the countercyclical capacity of 
macroeconomic policies, it has also reminded us 
of the need to prioritize production policies while 
expanding the coverage and improving the design of 
social policies. This confirms the need to rebuild the 
capabilities that will allow the State to resume strategic 
planning of long-term policies, create more leeway 
for fiscal policy and design appropriate instruments 
to deal with the structural challenges affecting the 
current pattern of development in the region.
This article offers a reflection on State policies 
and action in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
It advocates new forms of policy intervention and 
management, without which there can be no progress 
towards the different goals of development combining 
growth with equality and sustainability. At the same 
time, it argues for a new debate and for the centrality 
of politics when it comes to redefining the roles of 
the State and the market, so that the requirements of 
development can be reconciled with the expansion of 
citizen rights and democratic institutions.
This article is structured as follows. Section II 
briefly reviews the macroeconomic performance of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, discussing how 
this relates to external dependency and the structural 
problems that have traditionally afflicted the region. 
Section III supplements the analysis by discussing the 
accompanying social trends in the region. Transmission 
mechanisms and the effects of the crisis on the region 
are analysed in section IV, as are the responses of the 
Latin American and Caribbean countries. Section V 
presents the post-crisis scenario and discusses the old 
and new structural problems already brought out in 
the tradition of ECLAC thought. These are reflected 
by the persistence of major divides in society (poverty, 
exclusion and unequal distribution of income), in 
the productive realm (investment, productivity and 
innovation), in the fiscal area (the level and efficiency 
of fiscal expenditure and tax collection) and in the 
environmental arena (low-carbon production and 
energy efficiency). It is argued that the last of these 
is not just a condition of viability for growth and the 
welfare of future generations, but also and increasingly 
a requirement of  the international “new normal” 
now taking shape, an emerging characteristic which 
will constrain the carbon content of goods. These 
constraints will have substantial repercussions on the 
international trade and global role of Latin America 
and the Caribbean in the post-crisis world.
I 
Introduction
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Macroeconomically, the region has been characterized 
by low and volatile growth, particularly since the 
1980s, and the result has been a persistently wide 
gap in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
between Latin America and the Caribbean and the 
developed countries.
GDP growth fell from about 6% in the 1970s to 
2% in the 1980s (the “lost decade”) and some 3% in 
the 1990s. The “lost decade” was characterized by 
low rates of  growth and investment, partly owing 
to the tremendous effort required to pay down the 
debt taken on in the 1970s. This was compounded by 
acute macroeconomic instability with very high levels 
of inflation that spilled over into hyperinflationary 
episodes in some countries, severely unbalancing the 
economy and aggravating the problems of poverty 
and inequality. Where economic policy was concerned, 
the primary goal was to reduce inflation, and short-
term concerns predominated as a result (ECLAC, 
2002). During the 1980s, furthermore, not only did 
the region have to cope with a sharp fall in its GDP 
growth rate, but social conditions deteriorated and it 
fell far behind a rapidly moving technology frontier. 
Latin America and the Caribbean thus went into the 
1990s weakened, with no improvement in productivity 
and no track record in disseminating technological 
innovations or expanding production capabilities.
The international omens in the early 1990s were 
more favourable, with the Brady Plan (1989) facilitating 
a return to international financial markets. This more 
propitious environment played a significant role in 
the success of the bolder stabilization plans adopted 
in the 1990s, where the stress was on measures to 
liberalize the economy, including trade.
The vital macroeconomic advances made as the 
1990s went on should not be overlooked, in particular 
the success of Latin American and Caribbean economies 
in avoiding new inflationary excesses or any serious 
loss of fiscal control generally. These were positive 
aspects of  macroeconomic policy administration; 
however, some of the collateral effects did not receive 
the attention they merited, and this was particularly 
true of short-term external capital inflows.
For all the success in combating inflation, there 
was no strong upturn in growth. Nor was stability 
wholly achieved, as the period was characterized by 
a run of external crises that became more recurrent 
and contagious towards the end of the decade, most 
particularly the Mexican crisis of December 1994, 
the Asian crisis of 1998, the Brazilian crisis of early 
1999 and the Argentinean crisis of 2000-2001. The 
result was that growth fell off  sharply and volatility 
increased. This period of  stagnation (from the 
perspective of growth) ended with half  a decade of 
impressive economic expansion (2003-2008) driven 
by higher commodity prices and a strong impetus 
from the global economy.
In both the 1980s and the 1990s, the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean tended to follow 
procyclical policies which amplified the upturns and 
downturns of the growth cycle (Ffrench-Davis, 2005). 
These policies passively tracked booms and busts in the 
supply of capital, so that phases of excessive borrowing 
coupled with currency appreciation were followed by 
severe contractions and sharp depreciation (Stiglitz 
and others, 2006). All this negatively impacted growth, 
stability and the development of technological and 
production capabilities, which were inevitably affected 
as they struggled to adjust to frequent fluctuations in 
relative prices and in demand and output levels. In 
particular, the emphasis on balancing budgets and 
using inflation control instruments (particularly interest 
rates) without at the same time considering the effects 
on the exchange rate (and competitiveness) helped to 
generate a surge in imports and reduce the density of 
the input-output matrix in Latin American economies. 
These weaknesses in the production structure meant 
that exports created few spillovers for the rest of the 
economy, and this was compounded by increased 
vulnerability when the phase of favourable external 
conditions came to an end (Ocampo, 2005).
From 2002 until the outbreak of the present crisis, 
Latin America and the Caribbean were able to achieve 
growth rates similar to those of the 1970s. There was a 
boom period from 2003 to 2007 during which regional 
GDP expanded by some 5% annually, while per capita 
II
Stylized facts regarding macroeconomic 
performance
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GDP growth exceeded 3% for almost five years running, 
in a context of  positive current-account balances, 
fiscal surpluses and an unprecedented build-up of 
international reserves (see figure 1). At the same time, 
unemployment dropped sharply (from 11% to 7.4%) 
and the percentage of people below the poverty line 
fell by 10 percentage points (from 44% to 34%). This 
highly favourable combination of strong growth and 
good external balances was without precedent in the 
region’s recent history (ECLAC, 2009a).
A key factor in obtaining such favourable 
results was the growth of the world economy, which 
averaged close to 3.6% a year during the 2003-2008 
period (DESA, 2010). This resulted in an expansion 
of the region’s international trade, which rose 138% 
in value, and a steady improvement in the terms 
of trade, which improved by 25% over the period. 
The economic expansion of Asia, and particularly 
China, where growth averaged 11% a year over the 
period, was critical to this improved performance in 
the global economy, with powerful repercussions for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Rosales, 2009). 
Meanwhile, the new role of the Asian countries in 
the international economy has a dual character which 
should not be overlooked. While these countries pose 
a strong competitive challenge to the region in some 
branches of  manufacturing, they are also driving 
growth in international demand for the commodities 
the region exports. This dual effect means that the 
impact of Asia has varied depending on countries’ 
international specialization. On the one hand, large 
natural resource-based commodity exporters have 
benefited substantially from Asian demand and the 
improving terms of trade. In South America, which 
is where most commodity exporters are, the terms of 
trade rose by 33% over the period. Conversely, countries 
that export labour-intensive goods, such as Mexico, 
and that are not rich in natural resources (like many 
of the Central American and Caribbean economies) 
have suffered greatly from Chinese competition 
FIGURE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean: per capita GDP growth, current account
and overall ﬁscal balance
(Annual growth rates and percentages of GDP)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of  official figures. 
a Projection for 2009.
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and are now subject to greater constraints. In turn, 
countries that export low- and medium-technology 
goods, like Brazil, have been left in an intermediate 
situation, although there is evidence that they are 
being increasingly affected as China diversifies its 
exports into more technology-intensive goods (ECLAC, 
2009b and 2009f).
Unlike other periods, 2002-2008 was distinguished 
by prudent management of the favourable external 
shock and by macro policies that yielded positive 
fiscal results, a build-up of external assets to cope 
with contingencies, low rates of unemployment and 
inflation and strengthened domestic financial systems 
(ECLAC, 2008b).
III
Social trends and changes
Cycles of growth and stability have their counterpart 
in society. The effects are particularly important in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, characterized as 
they historically have been by persistently high levels 
of inequality. As figure 2 shows, charting poverty over 
time produces a parabola which roughly tracks the 
growth phases of the region. Thus, poverty increased 
from the 1980s to the early 1990s before declining, 
with the incidence of poverty diminishing from 48% 
to 33% between 1990 and 2008.
Poverty levels rose towards a peak during the 
“lost decade” of the 1980s owing to lack of growth 
and to fiscal restraint, which negatively affected social 
spending. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, as 
growth and employment began to pick up and social 
policies were strengthened, the trend towards rising 
poverty was reversed and it began to retreat. There 
have been substantial social advances in Latin America 
and the Caribbean over recent years, improving the 
overwhelmingly negative picture inherited from the 
“lost decade”. From 2002 onward, steady growth 
and the application of social policies on a larger scale 
drove poverty down to its lowest level of the past 30 
years (ECLAC, 2009d).
Six years of  steadily declining poverty and 
inequality ended in 2008. It must be made clear that 
for all the progress since the late 1980s, there is still 
a long way to go. In 2008, compared to 1980, there 
were 44 million additional people living in poverty, 
and of those 9 million were living in extreme poverty. 
By the end of 2008 there were still 180 million people 
in poverty in Latin America, a high enough figure 
FIGURE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean: poverty rate, 1980-2008
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of  official figures.
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to alert us to the need to improve policies aimed 
principally at this section of the population.
An assessment of  the full six years, including 
the 2008 results for countries with information 
available, yields a positive final balance in the struggle 
against poverty. For the first time, as figure 3 shows, 
all the region’s countries had a lower poverty rate 
than in 2002 or thereabouts. The percentage annual 
decline was most substantial in Argentina, the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Peru, Nicaragua, 
the Plurinational State of  Bolivia, Honduras and 
Brazil, while at the other extreme there were smaller 
reductions in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Paraguay and Uruguay.
The extreme poverty rate also fell everywhere 
except the Dominican Republic and Uruguay. 
Although extreme poverty rates generally fell by fewer 
percentage points than poverty rates, the picture is the 
reverse when absolute changes are compared, with 
living conditions improving especially for those at 
the bottom of the income distribution despite rising 
food prices over the last year.
Where inequality is concerned, between 2002 and 
2008 the Gini index dropped substantially in several 
countries, particularly the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (-18%), Argentina (-10%), Peru (-9%), the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Nicaragua, Panama and 
Paraguay (-8% in all of these). The only countries where 
income concentration increased in the period were 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala. 
It should be mentioned that the Colombia data are 
from 2005 and those of Guatemala from 2006, which 
means they may not be representative of the 2002-
2008 period (see figure 4).
The combination of better distribution and rising 
average household incomes made a considerable 
FIGURE 3
Latin America and the Caribbean: annual variation
in poverty and extreme poverty rates, 2002-2008
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of  special tabulations of  household 
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contribution to reducing inequality, something reflected 
by a drop in the Gini coefficient from 0.55 to 0.52. 
This reduction in inequality is not small (although 
inequality is still a long way from acceptable levels) 
and in some countries it has been very substantial, 
examples being Brazil, Argentina, the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, Peru and the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela. It should be recalled that a reasonable 
range of variation for the Gini index over a 10-year 
period is between 5% and 10%. In Latin America and 
the Caribbean, it dropped by an average of 3% for all 
the countries over six years, and by more than 5% in 
some. These are very substantial changes, especially 
in a region where inequality has traditionally proved 
very intractable (ECLAC, 2009d).
To sum up, in the third quarter of  2008, Latin 
America and the Caribbean closed a cycle of economic 
expansion (2002-2008) that saw substantial and 
consistent improvements in levels of  poverty (which 
fell from 44% to 33%) and extreme poverty (from 
19.4% to 12.9%), in the employment rate (which rose 
from 52% to 55%) and, in many cases, in equality 
(a decline in the Gini coefficient from 0.55 to 0.52). 
Although there are differences between countries, 
the improvements occurred in almost all of  them. 
This progress deserves to be highlighted, especially 
given the earlier record of  the Latin American 
economies, with inequality proving particularly 
hard to correct.
Although the trends have clearly been favourable, 
the results of  the last six years do not change the 
fact that the Latin America and Caribbean region 
is one of the world’s most unequal. Its record has 
improved, but not by as much as other developing 
regions’, and the absolute number of  poor and 
extremely poor people remains very high. All this 
means that governments cannot afford to lower their 
guard over the coming years in the struggle against 
social problems that still pose a serious obstacle to 
Latin American development.
FIGURE 4
Latin America and the Caribbean (18 countries): 
Gini coefﬁcient, around 2002 and 2008
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of  special tabulations of  household 
surveys from the countries concerned.
BR: Brazil. BO: Plurinational State of  Bolivia. HN: Honduras. NI: Nicaragua. CO: Colombia. PY: Paraguay. AR: Argentina. PA: 
Panama. GT: Guatemala. CL: Chile. MX: Mexico. DO: Dominican Republic. SV: El Salvador. PE: Peru. EC: Ecuador. CR: Costa 
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Although the  reg ion was  bet ter  p laced 
macroeconomically to deal with this economic crisis 
than with previous ones, going into it with strong 
growth, a cushion of international reserves, a better 
fiscal situation, low unemployment and inflation and 
relatively sound financial systems, the scale of the 
present crisis has had substantial negative effects on 
the countries of the region.
GDP fell by more in 2009 (-1.8%) than at any time 
since the external debt crisis of 1982-1983. Indeed, 
apart from a small drop in 2002, it was the first time 
GDP growth had been negative since 1983. As figure 
5 shows, growth has fallen off  by more in this crisis 
than in previous ones, dropping on average from 
4.8% to -1.8%, which represents a decline of almost 7 
percentage points in the GDP growth rate. In the Asian 
crisis the decline was 4 percentage points, while in the 
“tequila” crisis it was 1.6 percentage points (Pineda, 
Pérez-Caldentey and Titelman, 2009).
The effects of financial crises have traditionally 
been associated with a considerable deterioration in 
external conditions. Trade has been a particularly 
important channel of  transmission in the present 
crisis, although there has also been a substantial 
decline in external financing.
Excluding foreign direct investment (FDI), net 
financial flows in six of the main countries of the 
region fell from 1% of GDP in the third quarter of 
IV
The current crisis, transmission
and response mechanisms
FIGURE 5 
Latin America and the Caribbean: GDP growth
before and during crises
(Average growth rates before and during the crisis)
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2008 to -1.5% in the second quarter of 2009.1 The 
regional balance-of-payments financial account 
result, including errors and emissions, fell from 
US$ 64.413 billion in 2008 to about US$ 53 billion 
in 2009. External financing constraints have led to a 
contraction in domestic lending, with growth in this 
indicator falling from 18% in January 2008 to 2% in 
September 2009.
Restricted though financial flows have become, 
the trade channel has been more important. The 
crisis resulted in a sharp dip in trade flows. In 2009, 
exports are estimated to have fallen by 24% and 
imports by 25% (ECLAC, 2009b; 2009g). These figures 
were also associated with a drop in FDI, remittances 
and commodity prices (see figure 6) (ECLAC, 2009h; 
Orozco, 2009).
While the emphasis in this crisis has been on the 
consequences for economic growth, it should not be 
forgotten that some of its most significant effects have 
been on employment/unemployment and poverty. The 
effects on employment have been considerable (see 
figures 7 and 8): the urban unemployment rate, which 
dropped from 8.9% to 7.2% between the first and fourth 
quarters of 2007, rose back to about 8.3% in 2009 as 
a result of the crisis. The rise in unemployment has 
1  The six countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru.
been compounded by a deterioration in job quality in 
some countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The increase in the number of people living in poverty, 
meanwhile, is put at 9 million. As figure 8 shows, the 
social cost of the crisis is greater than the projected 9 
million extra poor, since if  the earlier trend had been 
maintained there could well have been a further 5 
million drop in the number living in poverty (ECLAC, 
2009a; ECLAC, 2009f).
It should be emphasized that the region was 
able to confront the crisis from a position of 
macroeconomic strength, as was seen earlier, since it 
was running a current-account surplus and a fiscal 
surplus (see figure 1), while the social position was 
easily the best it had been in 40 years. A crisis whose 
origins lay outside the Latin American economies 
was met with countercyclical fiscal and monetary 
policies which mitigated its impact on growth, 
economic activity, employment and poverty (Kacef 
and Jiménez, 2009).
Given the constraints on monetary policy 
resulting from the low degree of  monetization in 
the region’s economies, and considering too the 
fiscal and institutional difficulties in many of  the 
countries (the lack of  projects, the constitution 
of  sectoral spending units and the institutional 
complexity of allocating, disbursing and evaluating 
public spending), fiscal policy proved an important 
FIGURE 6
Latin America and the Caribbean: 
crisis transmission channels
(Annual percentage rates of change)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of  official figures. 
N.B.: The 2009 figures are projections.
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FIGURE 7
Latin America and the Caribbean: urban employment 
and unemployment rates, 1990-2009
(Percentages)
FIGURE 8
Latin America and the Caribbean: poverty trend
and estimated effect of the crisis
(Millions of people)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of  official figures.
a Estimate.
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tool for boosting activity in the short and medium 
term. Despite the obstacles mentioned, the growth 
rate of public spending increased in some countries 
and sectoral policies were implemented in the areas 
of house-building (because of the spillover effects on 
employment and domestic demand), assistance for 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (because 
of  their importance in job creation) and support 
for economic sectors, especially agriculture, with a 
greater emphasis on social programmes, some of 
them focused on employment policy (see figure 9) 
(ECLAC 2009e; Sojo, 2009).
Positive signs began to appear across the region’s 
economies in the second half  of  2009. Industrial 
production and exports began to recover, even as 
rising activity levels overall and higher international 
trade volumes stoked demand for commodities, 
pushing up prices and improving the terms of trade. 
Share markets returned to pre-crisis values, and the 
region was once again able to tap the international 
supply of credit.
Projected growth for 2010 is 4.1%, and the 
figure is expected to be somewhat higher in South 
America than the rest of the region, given the larger 
size of  some countries’ domestic markets and the 
broader diversification of export markets (ECLAC, 
2009a). Also contributing to this expectation is the 
larger role of China in several countries’ trade and 
the recovery in commodity prices. Conversely, slower 
growth is expected in more open economies with a 
portfolio of trading partners that is less diversified 
and more tilted towards manufacturing (such as 
Mexico and Central America). Much the same may 
be said of the Caribbean economies, some of which 
are experiencing financial and currency difficulties. 
Generally speaking, the essential factors underpinning 
this growth are the recovery in private consumption 
and the rise in gross fixed capital formation, driven in 
part by fiscal stimulus packages whose effects will be 
fully felt in 2010. It also needs to be emphasized that 
commodity prices (particularly energy and minerals) 
have recovered to their 2006 levels.
 
FIGURE 9
Latin America and the Caribbean: composition of social
programme portfolios announced since the crisis
(Percentages)
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Nonetheless, there is a growing perception that the 
after-effects of  this economic crisis will shift the 
dynamic of growth and the structure of economic, 
financial and trading relationships towards what has 
recently come to be called a “new normal” in the 
global economy, consisting of the following elements: 
lower rates of  global economic growth, a greater 
role for emerging economies, a slowdown in trade 
growth, a tendency towards greater trade protection, a 
reduction in external credit (at least pending the design 
of a new global financial architecture that provides 
more stable conditions of access to external capital) 
and a transition towards economies with lower CO2 
emissions, with marked repercussions on conditions 
of  access to external markets and the creation of 
production and technological capabilities.
The recent economic crisis redefined the terms on 
which Latin America and the Caribbean confronted 
the challenges of growth and equality. Although the 
shape of the post-crisis world is still unclear, it will 
probably be one in which growth is lower overall 
because of  a contraction in aggregate demand in 
developed countries. Indeed, the potential GDP growth 
rate of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries is expected to be 
about 1 percentage point lower in the medium term 
because of  the crisis (OECD, 2009). The emerging 
economies could play a more prominent leadership 
role in this context. The fall in import demand in 
the developed economies will reduce the scope for 
emerging economies to sell their products into these 
markets, heightening competition and at the same 
time creating incentives for the adoption of growth 
strategies oriented primarily towards domestic markets, 
at least in larger economies.
Boosting growth requires changes in the 
composition of aggregate global demand that will not 
be easy to bring about. In the medium term, recovering 
the pre-crisis global growth rate will mean rebalancing 
aggregate demand between developed and emerging 
countries. However, there is little consensus or clarity 
about how this is to be achieved. To give an example, 
the developed countries account for a very large share 
of global consumption, with the United States alone 
accounting for 34% and the OECD for 84% of the total 
in 2004-2007. While the emerging economies (Asia, 
China) have scope to increase domestic demand, they 
face constraints on their ability to do so.
There is also a need to rebalance aggregate public- 
and private-sector demand in domestic economies. 
Fiscal stimuli cannot well be maintained indefinitely, 
as this would entail substantial growth in public debt. 
Accordingly, some public demand will need to be 
replaced by private demand.
In addition, the “new normal” will involve not 
just lower economic growth but also considerable 
constraints on financial sector expansion. This will 
mean smaller financial flows both globally and to 
developing regions. Consistently with the credit 
crunch, cross-border financial flows, after rising from 
US$ 1 trillion to US$ 10 trillion between 1990 and 
2007 (from 5% to 21% of world GDP, respectively), 
dropped significantly in 2008 to US$ 3.1 trillion (2% 
of  global GDP) (McKinsey, 2009). Private-sector 
financial flows to developing economies practically 
halved between 2007 and 2008 from US$ 1,250 billion 
to US$ 650 billion. The projected figures are US$ 350 
billion for 2009 and an estimated US$ 670 billion for 
2010 (IIF, 2009).
This trend will be contributed to by an increasing 
domestic bias, greater financial protectionism and 
changes to current financial regulations. Accordingly, 
there is expected to be less global financial integration, 
with a lower level of  cross-border flows (financial 
protectionism). Changes in financial regulation will 
result in far more exhaustive oversight and regulation to 
seal the gaps that existed before the crisis. Supervision 
will be further-reaching, encompassing the different 
market instruments and participants. This dynamic 
will result in the model changing to create a banking 
system that is more transparent and has lower levels 
of risk and leverage.
Lastly, the new normal will also bring changes 
to trade patterns. In particular, global trade growth 
is expected to slow. Predictions are for world trade 
volumes to contract by some 10% in 2009 before 
growing by about 1% in 2010 (WTO, 2009; IMF, 2009). 
The decline is expected to take place mainly in the 
V
The post-crisis scenario and
structural constraints
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developed nations, followed by a trade contraction 
in China.
These projections are based on expectations of a 
prolonged slowdown in import demand in the developed 
economies, greater use of “protectionist” practices, a 
slow recovery in credit and payment systems and the 
disruption of global production chains.
1. Investment and the productivity gap
While recognizing that macroeconomic policies operate 
in the short term, it is important to realize that the 
production structure, or some fundamental features 
of  it like investment and productivity dynamics, 
influence and affect the dynamic of macroeconomic 
variables (Ocampo, 2005). Willingness to invest in 
the region, and thus the dynamic of  productivity 
growth, has been affected by speculative financial 
flows and the risk of  local crises of  the kind that 
have tended to arise when capital flows have been cut 
off. In the long term, indeed, volatile output growth 
and unstable net capital inflows have translated into 
periods of underutilization of production capacity and 
deterioration of accumulated capital. The volatility 
of these flows (which has contributed to the volatility 
of economic growth) and the stagnation of domestic 
savings represent a serious constraint on efforts to 
renew investment and expand production capacity.
As the economies of  Latin America and the 
Caribbean come out of recession, actual GDP is once 
again lower than potential GDP, creating scope for a 
rapid recovery. Unless investment and thus production 
capacity begin to grow again, however, expansion of 
the production frontier and the consequent rise in 
potential GDP will be curtailed. In this context, the 
investment gap relative to GDP is still a determinant 
of the region’s development pattern (see figure 10).
There is an important debate in progress about 
the factors accounting for economic growth and the 
production frontier in the long run. While this debate 
is not yet over, opinions are converging on the idea 
that the ability to innovate and rapidly disseminate 
international technological best practices within the 
production structure is one of the keys to this growth. 
This position has been advocated by ECLAC since its 
earliest days (Prebisch, 1949) and is a very important 
aspect of its more recent contributions (ECLAC, 2007). 
From the ECLAC perspective, technological learning 
is closely tied to the production structure and to the 
institutional framework for education, science and 
technology activities.
The view taken is that the greater the weight of 
technology-intensive sectors in the production structure, 
the faster learning processes arise, innovation rates 
increase and domestic and international demand for 
a country’s goods expands. This last effect exists not 
FIGURE 10
Latin America and the Caribbean: investment rate, 1950-2008 
(Percentages of GDP on the basis of dollar ﬁgures at constant 2000 prices)
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only because demand for more technology-intensive 
goods is particularly dynamic, but also because 
technological capabilities are essential for an economy 
to adapt and respond to the frequent transformations 
that occur in the international market. Without these 
capabilities, exports will lose dynamism and growth 
will slow, leading to stop-go cycles whose rhythm is 
determined by external crises and booms in commodity 
prices or the availability of external financing —as 
has so often happened in the region.
The empirical literature recognizes the vital 
role played in economic growth by the production 
structure and the incorporation and dissemination of 
technical change (ECLAC, 2007). Recovery is more or 
less assured in the post-crisis period, as it is starting 
from very low output levels, but strong and enduring 
growth (which means a rise in investment and potential 
GDP) is a more doubtful proposition. Despite the 
recent boom, the evolution of the economy and the 
industrial sector in recent years does not seem to have 
led to major structural changes, a situation that is 
largely reflected in the industrial trade balance issues 
referred to. A similar conclusion emerges when the 
productivity levels achieved by the region’s countries 
are compared directly with those of the United States. 
The huge gap that currently exists is a measure of 
the challenges the region will have to confront in the 
coming years.
The relative labour productivity index for the 
industrial sector in Latin America and the Caribbean 
shows that the productivity gap did not narrow over 
the whole of the period considered (see figure 11). The 
gap tended to widen over the 1980s before stabilizing 
in the 1990s. From the mid-1990s, however, the relative 
productivity index began to decline again (meaning 
that the productivity gap widened). It is important 
to note that the contraction was particularly acute in 
the last six years of the series. There are two reasons 
for this. First, labour productivity in the industrial 
sector of the countries of the region rose by 2% a 
year between 2003 and 2007, the indicator’s worst 
performance in the last 36 years except for the “lost 
FIGURE 11
Productivity in Latin America and the Caribbean relative to the United States
and productivity in the United States economy, 1970-2006
(Percentages and index value)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of  official figures. 
N.B.: Productivity measured in industrial sectors.
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decade” of the 1980s. Second, after rising by about 3% 
a year for 20 years, productivity in the United States 
began to grow by 5% annually in the mid-1990s.
It is important to stress the role played in 
productivity trends by the interaction between the 
short and long term and by different economic 
policies. Every time there is a shock (in prices or the 
real exchange rate), productivity is lower throughout 
the adjustment period (Cimoli and Porcile, 2008). 
In other words, each shock has a structural impact, 
the ensuing changes and adaptations in production 
processes are costly, and it takes time to restore earlier 
competitiveness. The speed with which firms respond 
to shocks and the direction of change are critical 
in determining whether they remain competitive in 
the international marketplace. Consequently, there 
will be a spell in which productivity in the economy 
inevitably grows less strongly, and in Latin America 
and the Caribbean at least, this does not imply a 
longer-run rebound.
The time taken to adapt clearly depends on many 
factors, such as the particular characteristics of firms’ 
assets, productivity differentials between sectors and 
businesses, firms’ management strategies and the 
general characteristics of  human capital. In other 
words, there is a degree of rigidity in the technological 
and production capabilities of firms that determines 
the duration and direction of the adaptation process. 
This can result in a new, more competitive firm with 
an increasingly diversified product mix, or it may lead 
to the firm’s disappearance.
The end result where labour productivity is 
concerned is that Latin America and the Caribbean 
are not catching up with the frontier (represented 
by the United States). The effects of  the different 
crises are clearly visible in figure 11, which reveals 
an extraordinary plunge in relative productivity 
during the 1980s debt crisis, a modest recovery from 
the early 1990s and a new contraction beginning in 
the second half  of the decade (the “tequila” crisis). 
Underlying these fluctuations are alternate periods 
of  currency appreciation, trade liberalization and 
rising external debt, followed by fresh devaluations, 
as mentioned earlier.
Tackling the productivity gap is unquestionably 
crucial when it comes to sustaining international 
competitiveness with equality, as Fajnzylber has pointed 
out (Fajnzylber, 1990). However, there is a new key 
economic transformation variable whose importance 
has grown steadily over time, namely environmental 
sustainability, which will now be discussed.
2. Sustainable structural change
 and the environment
To achieve a development pattern that is virtuous 
and sustainable over time, macroeconomic equilibria 
are obviously not enough. There will also have to 
be a process of structural change that narrows the 
productivity lead of the most developed countries 
(convergence), as ECLAC has been arguing since the era 
of productive transformation with equity. There are now 
very clear signs that the growth pattern predominating 
in the world is not compatible with conservation of the 
environment. The estimated costs of environmental 
damage, including climatic problems with all their 
destructive consequences for human, physical and 
natural capital, are becoming increasingly evident. 
From an environmental sustainability standpoint, 
however, it is now imperative to find the path to growth 
that entails the least energy consumption per unit of 
output and the smallest impact on the environment.
The scenario in which the productivity divide is 
closed without exacerbating environmental problems 
can be defined as one of sustainable convergence. In 
point of fact, engineering-intensive sectors use less 
energy per unit of output than natural resource- or 
labour-intensive sectors. However, structural change in 
the region has not gone in the right direction as regards 
either technology or energy, since the picture is generally 
one of divergence in productivity combined with an 
energy consumption pattern that is unsustainable 
over time (unsustainable divergence). This type of 
growth pattern is often associated with intensive use 
of natural resources, as it prevails in mature sectors 
where technical change is incorporated more slowly. 
Furthermore, greater use of natural resources entails 
higher energy consumption. On the basis of the data 
presented earlier, it can be concluded that energy 
consumption per unit of output is expanding relative to 
the energy frontier and, simultaneously, that the region 
is not catching up in terms of productivity. Figure 12 
gives a graphical description of the situation, with 
a “scissor” shape that opens up over time depicting 
the widening of  the productivity and energy gaps 
between Latin America and the Caribbean and the 
United States.
Some of  the highest growth in fossil fuel 
emissions is to be found in the Caribbean, particular 
examples being Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and 
the Dominican Republic, although some Caribbean 
countries such as Cuba and the Dominican Republic 
have made considerable progress with reforestation. 
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In the Latin American context, this is expected to be 
one of the regions hardest hit by a combination of 
climate change effects manifested in bleaching of 75% 
of coral reefs in the coming 30 to 50 years (Samaniego, 
2009), owing to rising ocean temperatures, the loss or 
erosion of land caused by the thermal expansion of 
the sea and the growing intensity of extreme weather 
events such as floods and hurricanes. Given its limited 
economic diversification, with heavy dependence on 
the primary sector and tourism, the region could face 
very substantial economic repercussions.
Energy efficiency and environmental protection 
are among the demands imposed by climate change, 
and count among the challenges for Latin America 
and the Caribbean in the new international context. 
ECLAC has projected that, without international 
mitigation efforts, by the end of the century the region 
could be experiencing large losses in agriculture and 
biodiversity, severe pressure on infrastructure and a 
rise in the intensity of extreme events, the cumulative 
impact of which could add up to a substantial portion 
of current GDP (ECLAC, 2009c). Unless urgent action 
is taken to alter this path, environmental strains will 
reach historically unprecedented proportions over 
the coming decades. The scientific evidence is very 
conclusive and urgent changes are needed in modes 
of  production and consumption, especially where 
energy is concerned.
Following the sparse (and legally non-binding) 
results of  the World Climate Change Summit in 
Copenhagen in December 2009, where participants 
agreed to limit the global temperature rise to two 
degrees centigrade, but without setting emissions 
figures for 2020 and 2050, and to commit resources 
to poor countries to allow them to stop deforestation, 
the challenge of  moving towards lower-carbon 
economies has taken on a renewed urgency. Two 
international approaches remain open. The first is 
FIGURE 12
Latin America and the Caribbean (4 countries): energy gap 
and relative productivity,a,b 1996-2006 
(Index values)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the Industrial Performance 
Analysis Program (PADI) and industry surveys from the countries: National Institute of Statistics (INE) in Chile, National Administrative 
Department of Statistics (DANE) in Colombia, National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI) in Mexico, Brazilian 
Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE) and Bureau of  Economic Analysis (BEA) in the United States.
a The countries taken are Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico.
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to follow a negotiated path based on shared values, 
agreed timetables and matching efforts and criteria 
based on common but differentiated responsibilities 
within a framework of multilateral negotiations. The 
second is to go down the road of unilateral initiatives 
applied indiscriminately and without distinction as 
to relative development levels, and governed only by 
the laws of competition.
Among the measures that will form part of the 
climatic and economic “new normal” is the application 
of unilateral trade regulations based on the carbon 
content of goods exported to the developed economies, 
implying a serious risk that mitigation could largely 
be shifted on to developing economies, if  not in this 
way then through other economic channels such as 
conditional access to credit. Consideration is also being 
given to applying countervailing tariffs to imported 
carbon-intensive goods from 2020. Developing countries 
will need to prepare themselves if  they are to avert a 
possible loss of export markets as competitors better 
equipped to meet these demands appear.
In summary, the problems of sustainability and 
the new regulations beginning to appear around the 
world could become another constraint on economic 
growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, 
if this new context is taken as an opportunity to renew 
infrastructure, improve production and technological 
processes with a view to creating more efficient means 
of transportation and put in place new lower-emissions 
production methods, fresh prospects for long-term 
growth could open up. This will mean coordinating 
investment incentives (still very limited) and national 
innovation systems (still weak) to boost investment 
and innovation rates on the basis of less polluting 
technologies. There is thus a need to ensure that 
Latin America and the Caribbean have access to the 
sustainable technology frontier and can approach it 
more quickly.
3. Distribution and the equality gap
Latin America and the Caribbean continue to display 
high levels of inequality and, as already mentioned, 
there is no prospect of  reducing these inequality 
and poverty rates in a context of low growth where 
employment and productivity also remain low. 
Growth does not in itself  guarantee improvements in 
income distribution, but in combination with more 
determined and consistent rights-based social policies 
(Hopenhayn, 2001) it has a crucial role to play in 
improving it. On the other hand, rising productivity 
itself  makes it viable (under certain conditions) for 
output, wages and employment to expand in parallel, 
helping to reduce heterogeneity in the production 
system and close the productivity gap (Infante and 
Sunkel, 2009).
Social indicators reflect a positive trend that is a 
product of economic growth, but also of institutional 
advances and public policies for fighting poverty, 
exclusion and inequality. The first evidence for this 
is the steady growth of social spending over more 
than two decades, both in per capita terms and as a 
percentage of GDP. Changes in income distribution 
over the period contributed to the reduction in poverty, 
although not by as much as they could have. The change 
in poverty and extreme poverty rates can be broken 
down into two components: average income growth, 
or the “growth effect”, and changes in the way income 
is distributed, or the “distribution effect”. This type 
of analysis allows us to see that the “growth effect” 
was the main factor explaining the retreat of poverty 
between 1990 and 2008, accounting for about 85% of 
this, while the “inequality effect” accounted for the 
remaining 15%. The contribution of distributional 
improvements to poverty reduction occurred chiefly 
in the 2002-2008 period (ECLAC, 2009d). 
Labour income was the source that contributed 
most to reducing poverty between 1990 and 2008. The 
positive change in per capita labour income was due 
chiefly to the decline in the demographic dependency 
ratio (commonly termed the “demographic dividend”) 
in all countries other than Uruguay, and to a large 
increase in the economic activity rate. Equally, 
income per worker differed substantially between 
countries. The countries where poverty fell most (as 
a percentage variation in the rate) —namely Brazil, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador (urban areas) and Panama 
(urban areas)— are the very ones where income 
per worker in poor households increased the most. 
Colombia is an exception here, since although this 
variable did rise substantially, poverty declined at 
a considerably lower rate, partly owing to a rise in 
unemployment. In the other countries, income per 
worker tended to decline.
One worrying feature of the poverty trend in 
Latin America and the Caribbean is the persistence of 
divides in people’s vulnerability to poverty depending 
on demographic characteristics, particularly age, 
sex and ethnic origin. Children are among the most 
exposed to poverty. The incidence of poverty is 1.7 
times as high on average among under-15s as among 
people over that age. Between 1990 and 2008, the ratio 
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between child and adult poverty rates rose in most 
of the region’s countries, the largest increases being 
in Brazil, Panama and Uruguay.
Despite the active policies implemented, the 
crisis reversed two trends that had become well-
established over the previous five years: the decline 
in unemployment and in poverty. Public social 
spending, along with spending on industrial policies, 
is essential to consolidate what has been achieved and 
to enhance equality.
The crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean in 
the early 1980s severely constrained public spending. 
The policy options for closing the widening fiscal gap 
(the subject will be returned to in the next section) 
were to increase the tax take or cut public spending, 
and it was the latter option that was chosen as the 
adjustment variable to restore the fiscal accounts, with 
all the negative effects that ensued for social spending 
at a time of diminishing well-being in society.
The upward trend in public social spending 
since the early 1990s is indicative of the progressive 
commitment of  the Latin American countries to 
allocating public resources to social policies, thereby 
giving these stronger financing guarantees and greater 
institutional stability and legitimacy, although such 
efforts have been limited considerably by the degree of 
development attained by the countries (ECLAC, 2006). 
In the face of old and new social and economic risks 
in each country, the availability of public resources 
to finance social protection systems is directly related 
to governments’ tax-raising capacity. Tax burdens 
continue to be low in the region, however, and this is 
a factor that weighs heavily on budgets. Nonetheless, 
governments have made considerable efforts to increase 
the sums budgeted (in a context of  greater fiscal 
discipline than before), particularly those earmarked 
for social functions. Despite such government initiatives 
to increase it, social spending in the region is still 
inadequate and is not having the impact needed to 
improve well-being and equality. Its behaviour is still 
procyclical and it tends to tighten at times of crisis. This 
illustrates the budgetary constraints and limitations 
facing the least-developed countries, as it is these 
that have the least capacity for taking countercyclical 
measures at times of economic contraction.
4. The ﬁscal gap and public policy ﬁnancing
The subject of the fiscal gap should be very prominent 
in future policy design, as it affects variables that are 
extremely important both in the short term (such as 
inflation and the activity level) and on a longer view 
(the capacity for financing social and production 
policies). Public policies require financing mechanisms 
that do not go counter to the goals of macroeconomic 
stability, learning and innovation, and equality.
In the period from 2002 to 2008, sound fiscal 
policy management (Martner, 2007) and the 
favourable international situation and macroeconomic 
environment led to improvements in macroeconomic 
policy design and management and to a reduction in 
the vulnerability of the public and external accounts, 
allowing debt stocks to be reduced and reserves to be 
built up. In 2006 and 2007, Latin America and the 
Caribbean as a whole recorded a fiscal surplus for the 
first time in the region’s history (see figure 1).
As the crisis progressed in late 2008, the existing 
need to mitigate volatility, strengthen growth and 
enhance equality in the societies of Latin America and 
the Caribbean was combined with new demands for 
countercyclical policies and instruments to protect the 
most vulnerable population from negative distributional 
impacts. In this context of higher spending demands 
at a time when fiscal revenues were falling because 
of lower commodity prices and activity levels, the 
greater policy leeway obtained in earlier years was 
reduced significantly (fiscal deficits in 2008 and 2009 
were -0.3% and -2.8% of GDP, respectively).
The fiscal gap is not just something that appears 
in difficult periods, however, but is actually a structural 
problem in the region’s countries and is also connected 
to the inequality characterizing them.
The manifold problems associated with a 
fragmented society where a small percentage of the 
population owns much of the wealth and large groups 
of households are below the subsistence line indicate a 
need to redefine the role of the State in the redistribution 
of income. The three main characteristics limiting the 
redistributional role of the State in the region are low 
tax burdens, the regressiveness of taxation systems 
and the misallocation of public spending.
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
have low levels of tax collection (although there are 
large variations between countries). The tax burden 
averages about 18% of GDP in the region, a low level 
given its degree of development, particularly when 
compared to the financing needs implicit in public 
policy demands. This means that public sectors have 
a very limited pool of resources on which to draw to 
meet the demand for goods and services from large 
sections of the population. The situation is even more 
extreme in certain Central American countries that 
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have tax burdens of some 10% of GDP and great social 
needs as a result of extremely high poverty levels.
Furthermore, tax systems in the region are 
regressive, i.e., they heighten income disparities. Less 
than a third of the tax collected comes from direct 
taxes, with most of the burden falling on consumption 
taxes and other indirect forms of taxation with clear 
regressive effects. The end result is that aftertax income 
distribution is if  anything more inequitable than 
primary distribution. The need, then, is to strengthen 
direct taxation and strike a better balance between 
this and indirect taxation. Any attempt to reform 
the tax system so that it redistributes resources to 
the poorest will require a redesign of  income tax 
and asset taxes. The latter ought to account for a 
larger proportion of all tax collected, and to be more 
progressive. However, these efforts will need to be 
accompanied by greater control of tax evasion and 
avoidance, as these are major sources of inequality 
and of injustices that imperil the legitimacy of tax 
systems, ultimately affecting their revenue-raising 
capacity. Higher tax collection is needed, therefore, 
but so are efforts to correct the regressive bias of the 
tax structure as far as possible.
Meanwhile, the volume and quality of spending 
need to be assessed for appropriateness. At times of 
crisis like the present, increasing or maintaining social 
spending becomes a priority, and it is important to assess 
its redistributional potential and the scope for targeting 
it on the most vulnerable population groups.
To sum up, there are problems with the quantity 
and quality of public spending that need addressing, and 
the relationship between taxpayers and beneficiaries, 
which has tended to heighten inequality in Latin 
American societies, ought to be reshaped. Consequently, 
there is a need for a new fiscal covenant (ECLAC, 1998) 
that spells out policy priorities and the sources of 
financing required to implement them, with growing 




The 2008 crisis and the signs of recovery that have 
recently appeared hold important lessons for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, concerning not just 
short-term mitigation of the effects of the crisis, but 
also the long-term vulnerability of the predominant 
growth pattern. The equality, productivity, investment 
and fiscal gaps that have long acted as obstacles to 
growth with equality are still there, compounded now by 
increasingly urgent demands relating to the environment 
and climate change. The persistence of old gaps and 
the appearance of new ones suggest very clearly that 
the policy responses traditionally offered by the region 
have not been enough to spur development.
On top of this, the contours of the post-crisis 
scenario do not seem to be those of the past. While 
the region may have recovered its former growth rate in 
late 2009, with an expansion of 4.1% forecast for 2010, 
it will be faced with a different context. In the course 
of 2010, those elements that some see as constituting 
what has begun to be called the “new normal” in the 
global economy will start to become increasingly 
evident. They are: lower rates of growth in the global 
economy; a new role for emerging economies; slower 
growth in trade flows; greater financial protectionism; 
the construction of a new global financial architecture; 
and a shift towards economies with lower CO2 emissions. 
This new reality makes the old policy responses (both 
excessive protectionism and ill-considered liberalization) 
even less appropriate, and strengthens the case for a 
fresh approach.
The view taken in this study is that the structuralist 
tradition offers valuable insights for our understanding 
of the crisis and the post-crisis situation, with emphasis 
on the role of policies designed to reform the production 
structure and disseminate technical progress as a central 
component of growth with equality and sustainability. 
This thinking is all the more relevant when climate 
challenges are considered, as they entail changes in the 
way we produce and consume and in the way energy 
is generated and used that are making the carbon 
footprint a leading variable in countries’ competitiveness. 
Adaptation and emissions reduction policies require 
long-term planning. Furthermore, the new normal of 
environmental economics will involve carbon emissions 
caps and incentives, penalties or taxes likewise designed 
to reduce emissions, tradable emissions permits and 
even trade regulations based on the carbon content of 
exported goods (“carbon footprint”).
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Automatic market mechanisms are not enough by 
themselves to deal with this whole complex challenge 
of structural transformation. Besides, the market will 
generate new social and political strains and conflicts 
that will have to be responded to with more than 
purely economic thinking. It is therefore natural to 
expect politics to begin to play a leading role in the 
construction of the future once again.
This means, first of  all, thinking in a “long-
term” framework again in order to achieve equality 
through a rights and citizenship approach, with a 
welfare society as the ultimate goal. The short-term 
problems of  the crisis need to be resolved from a 
long-term perspective, which means developing the 
capacity to devise and implement public policies that 
can reconcile the different time horizons. The future 
will be constructed with ideas, clear leadership and 
long-term strategic visions but also, and essentially, 
with overarching political and social agreements to 
make development pathways viable and provide the 
countries of the region with democratic governance. 
It is essential to have a long-term strategic vision 
nurtured by the sovereign will through the institutions 
of democracy. These are ingredients inherent in the 
very concept of development.
Secondly, the centrality of politics makes it more 
urgent to consider what new functions the State needs 
to discharge to give substance to citizens’ development 
aspirations. It was long assumed that the market 
could provide public goods without intervention, 
but there is an increasing recognition that this is not 
the case. The State is the locus of political action and 
its role needs to be redefined so that it can guarantee 
provision of these goods. A new balance needs to be 
struck between State, market and citizens, and this 
will require the creation and reinvention of public, 
private, solidarity and community institutions. This, 
in turn, calls for the development of better systems for 
organizing and assessing public-sector administration 
in the interests of accountability and transparency. 
Reclaiming the public space for the collective action of 
all citizens rather than just the government or the State 
is essential for inclusiveness and for the full exercise 
of citizenship, and thence for the determination of 
a country’s priorities.
Underlying this whole task, thirdly, is the 
construction of a solid “fiscal covenant” that turns 
tax systems into more progressive structures and 
make policy financing viable. It will not be possible 
to achieve the different objectives proposed and 
give policies a wider role without the construction 
of political agreements, whether explicit or implicit, 
regarding the level, composition and direction of 
public expenditure and its financing.
Taken together, all these points add up to a 
need to design a “new State architecture” allowing 
the State to play an important role once again in the 
general welfare and as a leader in Latin American 
countries’ development strategies, thereby escaping 
the paradigm of “subsidiarity” relative to the market. 
What is proposed is that the role of  the State be 
redefined on the basis of a critical assessment of its 
historical performance, with proposals to endow it 
with adequate tools so that it can find its proper place 
in equilibrium with the market and citizen rights —not 
just the current generation’s, but also those of future 
generations, who will be inheriting an increasingly 
precarious environmental balance.
To sum up, while one size does not fit all and no 
model is right for everyone, and it is true that each 
society will have to consider and agree upon the right 
balance to strike in the light of its own development 
dynamic, it is also universally agreed that the State 
will have to play a more significant and assertive role 
in guaranteeing public goods, dynamizing growth, 
achieving economic stability, working for equitable 
fiscal reform, promoting the necessary economic 
convergence with innovation and generating consensus 
around fiscal covenants with clear redistributional 
effects. It is within the framework of this welfare State, 
as opposed to a merely subsidiary State, that it will 
be possible to relaunch development goals under the 
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